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COPYRIGHT = SPEECH
Derek E. Bambauer*
ABSTRACT
Expression eligible for copyright protection should be presumptively
treated as speech for First Amendment purposes. Both copyright and the First
Amendment share the goal of fostering the creation and dissemination of
information. Copyright’s authorship requirement furnishes the key link
between the doctrines. This Essay examines where the two areas of law align
and conflict in offering or denying protection. Using copyright law as a guide
for the First Amendment offers three benefits. First, many free speech
problems can be clarified when examined through copyright’s lens. Second,
this approach makes the seeming puzzle of non-human speakers
understandable. Finally, it can help end technological exceptionalism in First
Amendment doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright equals speech.1
This formula is plainly controversial, but it is also correct, as this Essay
will show. It reverses the usual scholarly flow: normally, copyright looks to the
First Amendment for guidance.2 Here, this Essay argues the First Amendment
has much to learn from copyright. This Essay takes the position that if
expression can be copyrighted, and if it does not fall into one of the categories
of material that the Supreme Court has designated as beyond the First
Amendment pale, then that expression is speech that enjoys First Amendment
protection.
This contention engages the hotly contested debate over what constitutes
“speech”—meaning expression that receives protection against government
regulation. Under Chief Justice John Roberts, the Supreme Court has
increasingly extended First Amendment protections—to violent video games,3
videos showing cruelty to animals,4 emotionally distressing demonstrations
near funerals of soldiers killed in combat,5 and information about physicians’
prescribing habits.6 While some scholars differ,7 many see the Roberts Court as
broadening the ambit of the First Amendment and reducing the potential scope
of government regulation.8

1 See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 118 (2008) (describing copyright as speech
regulation). I thank Alex Tsesis for this reference.
2 See, e.g., David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PITT. L.
REV. 281, 281 n.1 (2004) (listing articles); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970).
3 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011).
4 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010).
5 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
6 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
7 Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the First Amendment, and the New
Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 460 (2013).
8 See John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications,
30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 225 (2015); Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence
of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012); Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly)
Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1530–31 (2015); Ronald Dworkin, The Decision that
Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 13, 2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/
may/13/decision-threatens-democracy/.
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Yet, the debate over speech continues to percolate, with decisions finding
that search results9 and off-label drug marketing10 constitute protected speech,
and decisions holding that conversations between physicians and patients about
guns11 or gay conversion therapy12 are not. There are contests over protection
for algorithmically generated information,13 revenge porn,14 emotionally
injurious speech,15 unflattering information,16 political expenditures by
corporations,17 network neutrality,18 and more. The hard question, as Toni
Massaro frames it, is what speech is “above-the-line” (cognizable for First
Amendment protection), and what is not?19 Copyright offers at least a partial
answer. This Essay explains how authorship can inform First Amendment
debates, applies copyright to free speech questions, discusses the implications
of this approach and its shortcomings, and closes with some thoughts about
higher-order ramifications of the methodology.
I. AUTHORSHIP
Copyright can be helpful to First Amendment conundrums because of its
requirement of authorship. The Constitution permits Congress to grant
copyright protection only to writings by authors,20 and the Copyright Act limits
its entitlements to original works of authorship.21 Over time, Congress has
increased the scope of works that can qualify for copyright, subject as always

9 See Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Search King, Inc. v. Google
Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003); S. Louis Martin v.
Google, Inc., No. CGC-14-539972 (Cal. Super. Ct., San. Fran. Cty. Nov. 13, 2014).
10 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012).
11 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, No. 12-14009, 2015 WL 4530452, at *28 (11th Cir. July 28,
2015) (holding the regulation withstood intermediate scrutiny and was a permissible regulation of speech).
12 Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 2014).
13 See Jane R. Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 60 (2014); Tim Wu, Machine Speech,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1496–98 (2013).
14 Compare Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2031 (2014), with Rebecca Tushnet,
How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2346, 2348 (2014).
15 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011).
16 See Farhad Manjoo, ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Online Could Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/technology/personaltech/right-to-be-forgotten-online-is-poised-to-spread.html.
17 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
18 See Jon Brodkin, AT&T et al Challenging Net Neutrality Order on 1st Amendment Grounds, ARS
TECHNICA (May 22, 2015, 11:15 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/att-et-al-challenging-netneutrality-order-on-1st-amendment-grounds/.
19 Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 370 (2014).
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
21 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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to the Constitution’s constraints.22 This expansion has survived challenge in
the courts, most notably when a lithography company defended against an
infringement suit from noted photographer Napoleon Sarony by claiming that
photographs were outside the Intellectual Property Clause’s (IP Clause) grant
because they lacked authorship—they had no spark of human creativity, but
only reproduced nature in static fashion.23 The Supreme Court rejected the
company’s contention—photography was nearly always imbued with authorial
choices, and hence it was within Congress’s power to award copyright
privileges.24
Since then, nearly all works that fall within the statutory categories of
copyrightable subject matter will enjoy protection, and the exceptions tend to
prove the rule. These works qualify for monopoly rents because they are
authored—they are the product of human creative labors.25 That is also why
they qualify as speech under the First Amendment. Even computer programs,
written in code impenetrable to most people, constitute expression of the ideas
of their programmers.26 As the lithography case held, any injection of
composition is enough to earn protection, and subsequent precedent sets a
minimal bar for originality.27
The copyright scholarship on authors, though, is highly variegated. There
are arguments about whether certain types of works ought to be within
copyright’s purview28 and over who ought to qualify as an author.29 There are

22 See Brad Greenberg, Against Neutrality, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 9–11).
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (listing eligible works of authorship), with Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1
Stat. 124 (listing maps, books, and charts as only eligible works).
23 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884); see Edward C. Walterscheid, To
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 63
(2003) (“[I]t took a significant legal fiction to read ‘writings’ as covering artistic works reproduced by
engraving and etching ‘historical and other prints.’ But once the fiction was achieved, it was only a matter of
time before it would be expanded to have ‘writings’ cover any and all forms of artistic expression in tangible
form.”). I thank Brad Greenberg for this reference.
24 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 60.
25 See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Place in the Future of Copyright, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 381,
381–82 (2009).
26 See, e.g., Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253–54 (3d Cir. 1983).
27 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
28 See Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking Constitutional Indifference to Harmful
Content in Copyright, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2013).
29 See generally Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal
Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186 (2008) (tracing the historical development of
American copyright law and the discourse surrounding authorship).
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critiques of the concept of authorship itself, particularly singular authorship.30
Principally, though, the fights are over who gets to be an author, and not
whether there is an author for a particular work.31 For example, Ann Bartow
argues that certain types of pornographic and violent works ought not to obtain
copyright protection, but she frames this as a policy matter and not as a
question of sufficient creativity.32 Wendy Gordon criticizes doctrinal and
statutory changes that benefit publishers rather than authors.33 And the
question of whether an actress with a bit part in a movie denigrating Islam
could use a claim of authorship to prevent the film’s distribution has seized the
attention of judges and scholars alike.34
Yet authorship is key to the linkage between copyright and the First
Amendment. Both seek to drive production and dissemination of information.
In each area, judges are chary of all but the most minimal substantive analysis
of content.35 Copyright uses authorship as a gatekeeping function: a work must
be one of authorship to obtain the doctrine’s entitlements. The First
Amendment is also enmeshed in the search for human creativity and
expression. The Supreme Court, in considering the interaction of these two
areas of law, has repeatedly emphasized their similarity of purpose,
particularly as a mechanism for reconciling their demands when they differ.36
This confluence makes copyright a natural resource for examining First
Amendment issues.37 Put simply, where one finds authorship, one should
expect to find speech.

30 See, e.g., Alan L. Durham, Copyright and Information Theory: Toward an Alternative Model of
“Authorship,” 2004 BYU L. REV. 69 (proposing a more inclusive, “unromantic” conception of authorship);
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549 (2010).
31 But see Michael Steven Green, Copyrighting Facts, 78 IND. L.J. 919 (2003) (arguing that facts,
properly understood, are works of authorship).
32 Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 ORE. L. REV. 1 (2012).
33 Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 613 (2014).
34 Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2014); see Garcia v. Google, Inc., U.S. CTS.
FOR NINTH CIR., http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000725 (collecting amicus briefs)
(last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
35 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).
36 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–90 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
37 See generally Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015 (linking
First Amendment and copyright to American constitutional commitments).
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S HANDMAIDEN38
Copyright can help First Amendment analysis. To determine what qualifies
as speech versus non-speech, First Amendment doctrine examines (among
other things) whether the expression is the result of human creativity.39 The IP
Clause and the First Amendment serve similar purposes and flow from similar
concerns, which is why copyright law receives greatly relaxed free speech
scrutiny.40 Outside minimal limits, congressional power to set the contours of
copyright protection is nearly absolute.41 This Essay suggests that the converse
should also be true: outside minimal exceptions, works satisfying copyright’s
requirements ought to enjoy greatly enhanced free speech protection. Thus,
where we find authorship for copyright purposes, we should expect to find
speech. Or, put another way, we should usually be surprised to find a
copyrightable work that is outside the scope of First Amendment protection—
where the government could regulate the work in contravention of the author’s
wishes or ban it altogether.42 This approach serves the First Amendment value
of imposing a structural constraint on governmental attempts to ban speech
either outright or via the imposition of regulatory costs and uncertainty.43 And,
this Essay’s methodology offers a rule-like test that has relatively low
transaction costs: it is easy to employ with confidence in its accuracy.
To be clear, the issue is not which tier of scrutiny a particular work falls
into but rather the binary question of whether it is “above-the-line” or below—
speech for First Amendment purposes or non-speech.44 Copyrighted works will
range across the spectrum of First Amendment tiers, from expression receiving
the highest protection (such as Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita,45 or Citizens
United’s Hillary: The Movie46) to that enjoying intermediate scrutiny (such as
44 Liquormart’s ads about its low prices for alcohol47) to that receiving no
38

With apologies to David C. Lindberg. David C. Lindberg, Science as Handmaiden: Roger Bacon and
the Patristic Tradition, 78 ISIS 518 (1987).
39 But see Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously?, 110 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(arguing for First Amendment rights for artificial intelligence in some circumstances).
40 See, e.g., Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889−90; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218−19.
41 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889–90; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–19.
42 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
43 See Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51 (2015); Philip Hamburger,
Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV. 479, 529–30 (2012).
44 Massaro, supra note 19, at 370.
45 See Banned Book Week: Lolita, MARSHALL U. LIBR., http://www.marshall.edu/library/bannedbooks/
books/lolita.asp (last modified Aug. 25, 2010) (describing the legal challenge to a novel in Ocala, Florida).
46 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
47 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996).
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protection (such as obscenity48). There is a plethora of copyrighted material
that falls within the commercial speech tier: advertisements for circus acts,49
commercials for terrible light beer,50 and the like.
There are also categories of material where copyright protection holds, and
yet the First Amendment permits the government nearly unfettered regulation
of content. And there are zones denied copyright protection where the First
Amendment operates with full force. The exceptions in both categories tend to
prove the rule:

48 See Kurt L. Schmalz, Recent Development, Problems in Giving Obscenity Copyright Protection: Did
Jartech and Mitchell Brothers Go Too Far?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 403, 404–06 (1983).
49 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing, 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903).
50 See Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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FIGURE 1: COPYRIGHT PROTECTION VS. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION

Copyrightable

Not
Copyrightable

No First Amendment
Protection51
Obscenity52
Child pornography53
Defamation54
Fraud55
Speech integral to criminal
conduct56
Incitement to violence57
Conduct58
Systems59
Functional matter60
Fighting words61

First Amendment Protection
The remainder

Ideas62
Unfixed material (federal
copyright)63
Copied/infringing material64
Facts65
Material subject to merger
doctrine66
Scènes à faire67
Public domain works68

51 The Supreme Court recently insisted that content-based restrictions on expression are limited to a
small set of historically dependent categories. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012);
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–72 (2010).
52 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Jartech Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1982).
But cf. Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video, 29 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
53 Eldar Haber, Copyrighted Crimes: The Copyrightability of Illegal Works, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 454,
470 (2014).
54 See, e.g., Ventura v. Kyle, 63 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1004–05 (D. Minn. 2014) (denying motion for
judgment as matter of law or for new trial in defamation suit by Jesse Ventura over “American Sniper”);
American Sniper, Registration No. TX0007495803.
55 Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1973).
56 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (upholding conviction for “threatening,
profane or obscene revilings,” which might nonetheless qualify for copyright).
57 Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308–09 (1940) (considering conviction for breach of the
peace based upon playing of phonograph record).
58 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–83 (1968). But see
Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 1986) (protecting fixed works of choreography).
59 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
60 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
61 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (requiring that fighting words be “directed to the person of
the hearer,” and that the “individual actually or likely . . . be present” (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 309 (1940))). Thus, fighting words are not fixed, and hence are ineligible for protection.
62 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
63 Id.
64 See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989).
65 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351 (1991).
66 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880).
67 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
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There are also unresolved areas, such as the now-famous “monkey selfie”
photograph, which likely does not enjoy copyright protection (since the author
is not human) and which hence might not be protected under the First
Amendment.69 Generally, however, First Amendment speech and
copyrightable works of authorship are coterminous.
III. IMPLICATIONS
This approach generates at least three useful insights. First, and most
critically, using copyright doctrine to assess speech offers a new angle on
challenging First Amendment questions. This Essay argues that copyright and
First Amendment protection normally travel together. Thus, where one finds a
work with sufficient authorship to obtain copyright protection, one should
nearly always conclude that the work merits protection against regulation
based on freedom of speech. For most works, authorship is straightforward,
and First Amendment recognition will follow as a matter of course.70 The work
moves above the line. That conclusion does not bar regulation by the state: it is
straightforward to impose controls on works that constitute commercial
speech,71 and even constraints on works at the heart of the First Amendment
can survive scrutiny with sufficient tailoring and justification.72 A copyright
approach can simplify the identification of protected speech, since (unlike with
copyright doctrine itself) it is not necessary to identify who the author is—it
suffices to ascertain simply that there is sufficient authorship. Speech where
the author is indeterminate, such as anonymous speech, is still constitutionally

68 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012) (denying copyright protection to U.S. government works); N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (permitting newspaper to publish secret government work).
69 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.2 (3d ed. 2014),
http://copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf (stating that the Office will not register, among other works,
“[a] photograph taken by a monkey”); James Eng, Monkey Selfie Can’t Be Copyrighted, U.S. Regulators
Confirm, NBC NEWS (Aug. 21, 2014, 5:22 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/monkey-selfiecant-be-copyrighted-u-s-regulators-confirm-n186296; Sarah Whitten, Photographer Continues Fight over
Monkey Selfie, CNBC (Dec. 15, 2014, 1:57 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/15/photographer-continuesfight-over-a-monkey-selfie-.html. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) has sued the
photographer who owns the camera on behalf of the monkey, seeking the proceeds from the photo on its
behalf. Complaint at 1, Naruto v. Slater, No. 3:15-CV-04324 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.media
peta.com/peta/PDF/Complaint.pdf.
70 See Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 381–82.
71 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993); Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
72 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 (2010); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191
(1992); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957). I thank Toni Massaro for helpful discussion
of this point.
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protected.73 In short, one can detect speech protected under the First
Amendment by analyzing whether speech is within copyright and is not within
one of the First Amendment exclusion zones. Works that meet those two
criteria obtain protection based upon freedom of speech.
Second, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens United v. FEC74 and
McCutcheon v. FEC75 begin to look unremarkable under this Essay’s
approach. If one accepts (even if just temporarily) the argument that financial
expenditures for political communications during campaigns implicate the
First Amendment, then the extension of this free speech protection to nonhuman persons becomes unexceptional.76 Copyright law has long conferred
entitlements over a protected work directly upon non-human authors at times,
even when humans physically generate the relevant protected expression.77
Indeed, copyright’s recognition of non-human entities as authors predates First
Amendment recognition of them as potential speakers by over seventy years.78
Under § 201 of the Copyright Act, the employer or entity for whom the work
was made is considered the author.79 This results in important differences in
entitlements: works for hire enjoy different (determinate) copyright terms,80
and are exempt from termination of assignments and licenses.81 Thus, for
copyright purposes, a management company was considered the author of a
large sculpture designed and constructed by three professional artists.82 The
management company supplied the money, the artists supplied the creativity,

73 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); see also Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451,
456 (Del. 2005); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 950 (D.C. 2009).
74 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
75 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
76 See Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J.
412, 420 (2013).
77 The 1909 Copyright Act provided for a “work for hire” designation for works created by employees
within the scope of employment, and for commissioned works. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730, 743–44 (1989); Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1939). The Supreme
Court first dealt with the work for hire concept in 1903. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 744 n.9
(citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903)).
78 Compare Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 244, with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (noting that the
“interests served by the [challenged] Act include restricting the voices of people and interest groups who have
money to spend” on campaigns (emphasis added)), and id. at 50 (invalidating provision imposing “a $1,000
limitation on the amount of money any person or association can spend during an entire election year in
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate” (emphasis added)).
79 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
80 Id. § 302(c).
81 Id. § 203(a).
82 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 1995).
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and under copyright law, the company attained authorship status.83 Juridical
persons can be co-authors with human ones under the right circumstances.84
“Work for hire” status is clear for employees: a software engineer who writes a
new program for Microsoft will find that the company, not she, is the author
and owner of copyright in the code.85 It is also plain—though perhaps still
odd—that a non-human entity can commission a work by a human artist and
thereby agree that the entity, not the artist, will be the author.86 Authorship is
fungible and context-dependent.87
But it can also occur, as with the sculptors, in situations where the humans
involved in creation likely did not understand that they would not be authors.
For example, cartoonist Jack Kirby, creator of the Fantastic Four, worked
principally for Marvel as an artist.88 Because his status appeared closer to that
of an employee than an independent contractor, the comics were deemed
works for hire, leaving Kirby (and eventually his heirs) with no copyright
interest.89 Instead, Marvel Characters, a corporation, was the author.90 Kirby
thought he was the author—certainly, his hands and creativity helped craft
some of Marvel’s most famous heroes.91
It does not seem quite so discordant for a corporation to be a speaker if it
can already be an author.92 As with First Amendment speech, the corporation
must operate through agents, but the firm’s interests and resources are at the
root of the expression. Some content would not exist without the firm: it would
be quite difficult for Joss Whedon to create The Avengers, with a reported
production cost of $220 million, without the financial backing and
83

Id.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 753 (1989) (noting that CCNV and Reid
might be joint authors).
85 See JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010).
86 17 U.S.C. § 101 (describing a “work made for hire” as, inter alia, “a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use” in one of nine enumerated types of works).
87 See Bambauer, supra note 14, at 2073 (“Authorship should be understood as an entirely utilitarian
concept—one that is otherwise normatively empty.”).
88 Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2013).
89 Id. at 143.
90 Id. at 140. Note that Marvel Characters did not become the author—the corporation was the author
from the moment Kirby set ink to paper.
91 See Jacob Reiser, Kirby/Marvel Settle—Law Surrounding “Work for Hire” Remains Unsettled,
ENTM’T, ARTS & SPORTS L. BLOG (Oct. 8, 2014, 9:58 AM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/EASL/2014/10/kirby
marvel_settle_-_law_surro.html.
92 For example, Twentieth Century Fox is the author and copyright owner of Crusade in Europe, even
though President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote the book. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib.,
429 F.3d 869, 881–82 (9th Cir. 2005).
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organizational resources of Marvel Studios and Paramount Pictures.93 And we
may remember the agents better in both cases—Robert Downey Jr. rather than
Marvel/Paramount, or Jamie Dimon rather than JP Morgan Chase—but we do
not think the speech is theirs personally.94 They are paid to deliver an author’s
messages. That author (a person) may be a corporation, non-profit, or
partnership, though not a human. This conclusion has drawn little complaint in
copyright for over a century, and may help us adapt to its extension in First
Amendment doctrine.95
Third, borrowing from copyright’s approach to authorship may helpfully
end technological exceptionalism in First Amendment law.96 Copyright has
had a fraught history with the combination of authors and technological tools.
Photography, for example, was widely viewed as outside the congressional
power to confer copyrights because the camera merely reproduced facts of
nature—there was no authorship to recognize.97 After the Supreme Court
refuted that argument in 1884, courts found copyrightable subject matter in
most cases, though they often struggled to articulate a rationale for so doing.98
Similarly, courts and scholars struggled with how to treat computer code
(software) from a subject matter perspective. After the report of the
Commission on New Technological Uses99—which argued that code was
already properly the subject of copyright as a literary work—Congress slightly

93 The Avengers, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0848228/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2015); THE
AVENGERS (Marvel Studios, Paramount Pictures 2012). But see Peter Schorn, Sky Captain and the World of
Tomorrow, IGN (Jan. 21, 2005), http://www.ign.com/articles/2005/01/22/sky-captain-and-the-world-oftomorrow (describing director who obtained $60 million in financing outside studio system based on
homemade six-minute demonstration movie).
94 Cf. Erika Kelton, More Compliance, Fewer Complaints Needed from JPMorgan’s Jamie Dimon,
FORBES (Jan. 26, 2015, 2:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2015/01/26/more-compliancefewer-complaints-needed-from-jpmorgans-jamie-dimon/; Ross Miller, Iron Man is Forever. Robert Downey
Jr. Isn’t, VERGE (Oct. 16, 2014, 8:47 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/10/16/6985725/marvel-iron-manis-forever-rdj-isnt.
95 See generally Nina Totenberg, When Did Companies Become People? Excavating The Legal
Evolution, NPR (July 28, 2014, 4:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/335288388/when-did-companiesbecome-people-excavating-the-legal-evolution (discussing differing views on how corporations have become
“people” with First Amendment protections in certain contexts over the last century).
96 Compare Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974), with Turner Broad. Sys. v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224–25 (1997).
97 Burrow-Giles Lithography v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58–59 (1884).
98 Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the Invention of
Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 438–51 (2004).
99 NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1978).
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modified the Copyright Act to clarify the matter.100 Though courts still
struggled at times to find the boundaries of software copyrights, the premise
that code and its outputs could be protected has been largely settled as a
doctrinal matter.101 Courts protected both the output of software code, such as
a video game display,102 and also its internal operations, such as operating
system code that controlled components.103 From a copyright perspective, code
and cameras teach the same lesson: the expressive output of human interaction
with machines can be protected.104
Yet similar First Amendment questions remain unsettled, at least among
legal scholars. Tim Wu argues that courts do not protect actors that perform
functional roles regarding speech, such as transporting or collating it.105 Oren
Bracha goes further, contending that search engine results are descriptively and
deservedly unprotected by the First Amendment.106 Jane Bambauer presses the
case that data must receive First Amendment protection (though at varying
levels of scrutiny) to prevent governments from interfering in knowledge
regulation.107 Eugene Volokh and Donald Falk also see search engines as
speakers, particularly given their editorial judgment in constructing results.108
James Grimmelmann, by contrast, seeks to chart a middle course: search
engines deserve protection in their role as advisors, but should face liability if
they deliberately mislead their users about their calculations.109 And
Annemarie Bridy sets out to show that works produced via artificial

100 An Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (amending §§ 101 and 117 of the
Copyright Act).
101 See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1448 (9th Cir. 1994).
102 Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1983).
103 Apple Comput., Inc. v. Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984); see Robert P. Merges,
Comment, Apple v. Franklin: An Essay on Technology and Judicial Competence, 2 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 62,
66–68 (1983).
104 See, e.g., Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Mannion v. Coors
Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Search King v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-021457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Ok. May 27, 2003); Jeff Roberts, Google Has Free Speech Right in
Search Results, Court Confirms, GIGAOM (Nov. 17, 2014, 10:05 AM), https://gigaom.com/2014/11/17/googlehas-free-speech-right-in-search-results-court-confirms/.
105 Wu, supra note 13, at 1496–98.
106 Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of Search Engine Speech, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1629, 1654–55 (2014).
107 Bambauer, supra note 13, at 60. Obvious disclosure: she and the author are married.
108 Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results
(2012), http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf. The paper
was commissioned by Google. Id. at 1.
109 James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 917–18 (2014).
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intelligence are more similar to directly human-authored works, and fit better
within current copyright law, than is widely assumed.110
Here, copyright doctrine presses towards the conclusion that protectable
outputs generated by code—itself a work of authorship in most cases—are
First Amendment speech. That does not insulate software firms from liability:
commercial spam can be punished without First Amendment objection,111 and
the FTC has a successful track record of punishing firms that vend malware.112
But it does suggest, if not compel, the government to meet a significant burden
before imposing penalties, rather than allowing the state to regulate this
expression as though it were beef jerky.113
IV. EXCEPTIONS
Sometimes the First Amendment and copyright part ways. The First
Amendment may protect speech ineligible for copyright for some reason, and
copyright may extend eligibility to expression that the government can regulate
or ban without First Amendment quarrel.114 Those divergences require
explanation.
The schism where the First Amendment withdraws speech protection, but
copyright extends it, is largely illusory. Here, the First Amendment tends to
trump. For example, few authors are likely to assert copyright protection over
child pornography, for the obvious reason that they will not prefer to confess
liability to law enforcement by way of the Copyright Office.115 Creators of
obscene, fraudulent, or defamatory materials are also unlikely to advertise their
110 Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, STAN. TECH. L.
REV., Mar. 2012, at 27.
111 See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–
7713 (2012) (regulating the use of spam messages); United States v. Ralsky, No. 07-CR-20627 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 24, 2009). But see Jaynes v. Commonwealth, 666 S.E.2d 303, 313 (Va. 2008) (blanket ban on unsolicited
e-mail violated First Amendment).
112 FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 895 (4th Cir. 2014).
113 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2666 (2011) (quoting IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, which
concluded that “that because [plaintiffs’] product is information instead of, say, beef jerky, any regulation
constitutes a [First Amendment] restriction. . . . such an interpretation stretches the fabric of the First
Amendment beyond any rational measure” (550 F.3d 42, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2008))).
114 But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (prohibiting government from banning
only fighting words that communicate a particular viewpoint or idea).
115 See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (requiring registration for U.S. works before an infringement lawsuit can be
instituted); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DEPOSIT REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION OF CLAIMS TO COPYRIGHT IN
VISUAL ARTS MATERIAL 3 (2012), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ40a.pdf (requiring deposit of two
complete copies for registration of photographs).
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illegality via registration.116 Even in these non-speech zones, though, copyright
has the decisional ordering right: the government must demonstrate that
expression is unprotected rather than protected. Copyright’s default of
eligibility operates properly here, but unlike in speech areas where First
Amendment protections attach, those protections are defeasible. In this zone,
since the state can ban this type of expression altogether, copyright does not
serve utilitarian goals much but instead may serve an expressive role.
The challenging zone is where the First Amendment protects as speech
expression to which copyright is denied.117 Here, copyright law is simply a
poor predictor, and one needs an alternative theory of the First Amendment to
explain why the information at issue counts as speech.118 This is unfortunate,
but inevitable—all theories of the First Amendment are incomplete. Exploring
the lacunae here, though, may prove useful.
The zone of free speech, but not copyright, protection can be helpfully
bifurcated into prudential and mandatory exclusions. There are areas where
federal copyright protection does not extend, but could. Two examples are
sound recordings and derivative works. Before 1972, the Copyright Act did not
include sound recordings as eligible subject matter; instead, bands and
musicians had to turn to state copyright laws.119 Congress changed that in
1972, but failed to sweep existing sound recordings within federal copyright
law—although it likely could have done so.120 Thus, there are works that are
not the subject of federal copyright protection that could, by congressional
grace, be so. Similarly, the Copyright Act denies protection to the original
expression contained in an unauthorized derivative work.121 Thus, someone
who writes a sequel to the movie Rocky without Sylvester Stallone’s
permission cannot protect even the original contributions to the sequel.122 This
is a deliberate congressional policy choice—the Copyright Act could extend
116 See generally James R. Alexander, Evil Angel Eulogy: Reflections on the Passing of the Obscenity
Defense in Copyright, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 209 (2013).
117 Unfixed verbal statements would not be eligible for federal copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(2012). However, some such statements are at the heart of First Amendment protections. See Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940).
118 See Bambauer, supra note 13.
119 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS 9
(2011), http://copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf.
120 Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391, 392 (1971). Sound recordings
became eligible for federal copyright protection as of February 15, 1972. See id.
121 17 U.S.C. § 103(a).
122 See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25,
1989).
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protection to those contributions, creating a system of “blocking copyrights”
similar to that of the Patent Act.123 Both of these are prudential exclusions:
copyright law could extend protection to this expression, but Congress has
decided not to.
For prudential exclusions, copyright can provide guidance to First
Amendment analysis, but it requires more work, and some conjecture, by
courts or other policymakers. The analysis has to consider not the Copyright
Act itself, but the reach of the Copyright Act consistent with constitutional
limits.124 That methodology can help guide free speech considerations, but is
only somewhat more determinate than the First Amendment itself. The IP
Clause offers a number of textual clues to limits on copyright—the
requirement of a writing (fixation), the requirement of authorship, and the
purposive mandate that Congress act to promote the progress of science—but
those are not nearly as precise or specific as the copyright statute.125 Thus, this
Essay’s methodology is of some, but limited, utility for First Amendment
analysis when treating prudential exclusions from copyright eligibility.
The second type of exclusion from copyright is mandatory: unfixed works,
ideas, facts, processes, concepts, scènes à faire, and the like. These exceptions
are constitutionally mandated.126 Ideas, processes, and concepts qualify for
patent protection as discoveries, if at all.127 Unfixed works do not count as
writings. And facts lack authorship.128 Processes might count as conduct, but
the other mandatory exclusions clearly qualify for First Amendment
protection. Facts are free speech; even false factual claims may be protected in
contexts such as political campaigns.129 Ideas are at the heart of the First
Amendment. And unfixed works, such as extemporaneous political speeches,
are similarly free speech canon.130 This is a zone where copyright and the First
Amendment share similar goals but must necessarily come to different
doctrinal results. Copyright denies protection to facts,131 scènes à faire,132 ideas
123 See Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing The Grey Album, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 345, 358 (2008).
124 Cf. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (holding that Congress acted within its constitutional
authority when it extended the terms of existing copyrights).
125 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
126 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
127 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
128 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1991).
129 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2555 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
130 Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
131 Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 344–45.
132 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
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(in the form of the merger doctrine),133 and similar types of expression
precisely to bolster informational output—if Ian Fleming could copyright the
suave British spy,134 Mike Myers likely could not make “Austin Powers,”135
nor could John Le Carré write his novels.136 The First Amendment protects this
material for precisely the same reason. Copyright accomplishes its mission by
conferring exclusive rights upon an author (or, on rare occasion, authors); the
First Amendment is inherently anti-monopoly. It seeks the widespread
dissemination of ideas and points of view, while copyright leaves that choice to
the author.137 This zone of conflict, then, is one where the doctrinal differences
between copyright and the First Amendment overwhelm their shared goals of
creating and disseminating information.
Copyright is, generally, a good guide to First Amendment speech. In areas
where copyright denies protection, but free speech provides it, the doctrines
conflict. However, copyright law helpfully spells out its exclusions—areas
where it is of no help in the analysis—leaving other theories or methodologies
to fill the gap.
CONCLUSION
This Essay’s approach to constitutional borrowing—drawing upon
copyright doctrine to illuminate puzzles about the boundaries of free speech
protection—generates several higher-order ramifications.138 First, the
copyright-driven methodology is likely to tend towards First Amendment
maximalism: the broad scope of subject matter will tend to sweep most
expression within the protective grasp of free speech. For some scholars, that is
a virtuous characteristic.139 For others, it may generate backlash, combining
extant fears about overweening copyright140 with new ones about “First
Amendment Lochnerism.”141 The latter concern seems hyperbolic—unlike
133

Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
See, e.g., DR. NO (Eon Productions 1962).
135 See, e.g., AUSTIN POWERS: INTERNATIONAL MAN OF MYSTERY (New Line Cinema 1997).
136 See, e.g., JOHN LE CARRÉ, THE SPY WHO CAME IN FROM THE COLD (1963).
137 But see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010).
138 See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 463 (2010)
(explaining the concept of constitutional borrowing).
139 See Bambauer, supra note 13, at 77.
140 See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Copyright Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 401, 402 (2006).
141 See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court v. America, 23 DEMOCRACY, Winter 2012, at 52,
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/23/the_roberts_court_v_america.pdf; Neil M. Richards, Reconciling
Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1211 (2005); Howard M. Wasserman,
Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 421, 424 (2006);
134
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freedom of contract,142 the First Amendment is explicitly included in the Bill
of Rights, and speech regulation in most areas operates unabated—but if one
favors restrictions on violent video games,143 or bans on videos showing
animal cruelty,144 the risk of a broader First Amendment will appear
disconcerting. If the First Amendment is not an automatic trump card, then
defensible regulations of information will be precisely that: capable of being
defended by the state as serving important interests and being properly
tailored.145
Alternatively, one might fear that Congress, confronted with a
constitutional doctrine that limits its legislative freedom to operate, might alter
the contours of copyright law to increase its power. Copyright already suffers
from a number of idiosyncratic industry-specific tweaks; the need to cabin
First Amendment protection might worsen the situation.146 There are at least
two responses that mitigate this concern. First, copyright industries have
proven highly effective in driving the expansion of the doctrine and its
entitlements in the past and could be expected to deploy their efforts to
preserve current scope.147 Thus, First Amendment pressures might, from a
policy perspective, helpfully balance the public choice problems inherent in
copyright legislation and rulemaking.148 Or the courts could examine copyright
not from the particular contours of current federal (and perhaps state)
legislation, but based on the overall scope of congressional authority under the
IP Clause. This would remove this Essay’s proposed copyright methodology
from the legislative process altogether, with the benefit of reducing strategic
behavior at the cost of losing more precise targeting based upon statute.
Susan Crawford, Verizon v. FCC: Why It Matters, SUSAN CRAWFORD (Sept. 8, 2013), http://scrawford.net/
verizon-v-fcc-why-it-matters/; Rebecca Tushnet, NFL Films Protected by First Amendment Against Players’
Right of Publicity Claims, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (Oct. 14, 2014), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2014/
10/nfl-films-protected-by-first-amendment.html.
142 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (“The general right to make a contract in relation to his
business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.”).
143 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
144 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010).
145 See Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First Amendment, NEW
REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-corporations-hijacked-firstamendment-evade-regulation (calling the First Amendment “the new nuclear option for undermining
regulation”).
146 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115 (2012) (regulating cable television and compulsory license for nondramatic musical works, respectively).
147 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 37, 62–63 (2000).
148 See generally Bambauer, supra note 43, at 65 (noting the “asymmetry between the government’s
ability to obtain results informally versus through rulemaking or legislative mechanisms”).
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Second, the reciprocity between copyright law and the First Amendment
might validate, if not create, a parallel that worries scholars in both disciplines.
The removal of formalities from the instantiation of copyright, combined with
the shift to digital formats, increasingly mean that most expression is
copyrighted.149 Copyright owners have also increasingly pressed the case that
any activity involving their works that falls within § 106’s entitlements must
either have an excuse (such as authorization or fair use) or infringe.150 That,
along with the elimination of the de minimis doctrine in some circuits, has
caused scholars such as Jessica Litman to worry that copyright has become
unbalanced and out of step with its history.151 Similarly, this Essay’s approach
might shift nearly everything above the line, making all regulation of
expression or information impermissible unless adequately justified.152 That
possibility has worried scholars in areas such as privacy, professional
responsibility, and securities regulation.153 It seems likely that much if not
most regulation in areas like the Securities and Exchange Commission’s rules
for publicly-traded equities would survive unscathed since the government
would be able to defend both the interest at stake and the tailoring of the rules;
however, it would come at some cost in litigation and uncertainty. Here, too,
the level of concern depends upon one’s normative priors, but the evolution
towards all-inclusive rules could be troublesome.
Lastly, tightening the link between copyright and the First Amendment
seems like a natural and inevitable consequence of the shift to an informationbased economy.154 Increasingly, America produces bits instead of things.
Trade in information leads both to conflicts over rights, property, or otherwise,
in those bits, and also to resistance to or wariness of governmental regulation
of communication. Here, recent presidential administrations have not helped,
149 See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487–88, 527 (2004). But
see Brad Greenberg, Comment, More Than Just a Formality: Instant Authorship and Copyright’s Opt-Out
Future in the Digital Age, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1028 (2012).
150 See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 65 (2003); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, http://archive.
wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html.
151 Jessica Litman, Fetishizing Copies, in COPYRIGHT IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (Ruth
Okediji ed., forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2506867.
152 See Massaro, supra note 19, at 426–27; Wu, supra note 145.
153 See Coates, supra note 8, at 237–38; Miriam Galston, When Statutory Regimes Collide: Will Citizens
United and Wisconsin Right to Life Make Federal Tax Regulation of Campaign Activity Unconstitutional?,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 867, 905–06 (2011); Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The
Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 51 (2012); Richards, supra note 8, at 1516.
154 See generally CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 4–5 (1999) (noting that
“[d]igital information can be perfectly copied and instantaneously transmitted around the world”).
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deploying both Internet and copyright policy to interdict disfavored
expression.155 Using copyright law instrumentally leads speakers and authors
to look to constitutional constraints to limit those efforts. Whether for good or
ill, the rise of digital networked computers and information exchange puts
pressure on copyright and the First Amendment both to expand their roles.
Copyright can serve as the First Amendment’s handmaiden: it can help
resolve thorny free speech questions by focusing attention on the creative
contributions that inhere in authorship. That role supports the generative
function of both areas of law and recognizes the inevitable ascendancy of
rights in and protection of information in an increasingly digital world.

155

See Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 877, 889, 896 (2012).

